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Trust aware routing in Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is an important direction in designing routing protocols for WSN that
are susceptible to malicious attacks. The common approach to provide trust aware routing is to implement an eﬃcient reputation
system. Reputation systems in WSN require a good rating approach that can model the information on the behavior of nodes
in a way that represents diﬀerent sources of this information. In some WSN applications, nodes need to be more cautious in
rating other nodes since it may be in a very hostile environment or it may be very intolerant to malicious behavior. Moreover,
to prove the creditability of a reputation system or its related rating components, a global and system-independent technique is
required that can evaluate the proposed solution. In this paper, a new rating approach called Cautious RAting for Trust Enabled
Routing (CRATER). CRATER is introduced which provides a rating model that takes into account the cautious aspect of WSN
nodes. Further, a promising evaluation mechanism for reputation systems called REputation Systems-Independent Scale for Trust
On Routing (RESISTOR). RESISTOR is presented which can be used to evaluate and compare reputation and rating systems in a
global, simple, and independent manner.
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1. Introduction
Sensor networks are susceptible to attacks at the routing
layer that are related to the node behavior. The most familiar
attacks are nonforwarding attacks in which a compromised
node will drop packets it receives instead of forwarding
them. Such attacks cannot be detected or avoided by identity
checking mechanisms. Hence, behavior trust should be
implemented in order to defend against these attacks. Trust
shall facilitate the cooperation among these nodes, though
“trust” is a complex concept and it is diﬃcult to define it
precisely [1, 2]. The trust has several characteristics that can
be summarized with the following six features: subjectivity,
transitivity, temporalness, contextualness and dynamicity,
and nonmonotonicity [3].
In this work, we adopt the following definition for
the “trust”: the level of confidence that a node has in
its neighbor’s cooperation [4]. This trust can be attained
following two broad approaches: centralized or distributed.
The centralized approach assumes a central agent that can
assess the “credibility” of each node and then disseminate
this information to all “real” nodes. It is obvious that such
approach is diﬃcult to realize in practice. On the other hand,
the distributed approach is a localized scheme where each
node assesses the credibility of its neighboring nodes and
accordingly it builds its trust-aware routing.
Reputation is another complex concept and is closely
linked to that of trustworthiness [1]. A reputation system
is a type of cooperative filtering algorithm which attempts
to determine ratings for a collection of entities that belong
to the same community. Every entity rates other entities of
interest based on a given collection of opinions that those
entities hold about each other [5]. In [1], the main diﬀer-
ences between trust and reputation systems are summarized
as follows. First, trust systems rely on the subjective view of
an entity to produce a score of an entity’s trustworthiness
whereas a score is produced by reputation systems as seen by
the whole community. Transitivity is the second diﬀerence
which is an explicit component in trust systems, whereas
reputation systems usually only take transitivity implicitly
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into account. Thirdly, trust systems usually depend on
subjective and general measures of (reliability) trust as input,
whereas objective information or ratings about specific
events, such as transactions, are used as input in reputation
systems.
In the context of MANET and WSN, the reputation of
a node is the amount of trust the other nodes grant to it
regarding its cooperation and participation in forwarding
packets [6]. Hence, each node keeps track of each other’s
reputation according to the behavior it observes, and the
reputation information may be exchanged between nodes to
help each other to infer the accurate values.
Any reputation system in this context should, generally,
exhibit the following three main functions [6, 7].
(i) Monitoring: this function is responsible for observing
the activities of the nodes of its interest set, for
example, the set of its neighbors [8].
(ii) Rating: based on the node’s own observation, other
nodes’ observations that are exchanged among them-
selves and the history of the observed node, a node
will rate other nodes in its interest set.
(iii) Response: once a node builds knowledge on others’
reputations, it should be able to decide about diﬀer-
ent possible reactions it can take, like, avoiding bad
nodes or even punishing them.
The rating component of a reputation system is a
very critical part since it is responsible for providing the
reputation of nodes. Thus, it can be considered as the heart
of any reputation system. To illustrate the rating operation,
assume that node A wants to evaluate a reputation value
for a node B that may or may not be directly monitored
by A. Then, the reputation value of B evaluated by A is a
number that reflects how good or bad node B behaves from
the perspective of node A, considering what follows.
(i) Monitoring results of all types of routing activities.
(ii) Monitoring results obtained by direct observations
from A as first hand information (FHI).
(iii) Monitoring results gathered from other nodes
observing B and shared with A as second-hand
information (SHI).
In this work, we are proposing a new rating tech-
nique called Cautious Rating for Trust Enabled Routing
(CRATER). Basically, this technique identifies three rating
factors: FHI, SHI, and Neutral Behavior period during which
a node is not doing any activity. The new contribution in
CRATER is its mathematical approach that is used to rate
nodes based on what we call cautious assumptions, which
are very true in most WSN. Moreover, we are proposing a
new promising mechanism to evaluate diﬀerent reputation
systems and their corresponding rating components called
Reputation Systems-Independent Scale for Trust On Routing
(RESISTOR). RESISTOR is based on the analogy of the
resistance phenomenon in electric circuits. It defines a
metric called “resistance” to represent how much a node is
resisting its malicious neighbors. Then, based on that figure,
the reputation system performance is being analyzed for
evaluation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we provide an overview of our proposed reputation system.
After that, the monitoring approach is described in Section 3.
Then, a detailed description of CRATER is given in Section 4
along with RESISTOR with some validation experiments
results and analysis. Section 5 then describes the response
(routing) component of our reputation system. In Section 6,
we show system performance evaluation with the focus on
system resistance behavior. This is followed by literature
review in Section 7. Finally, we conclude our paper with the
main findings of this research and future suggested work in
Section 8.
2. Reputation System Overview
2.1. Network Model. In this work, the nodes in our WSN are
deployed randomly or in a grid topology inside a square area.
It is assumed that nodes communicate via bidirectional links
so that they can monitor each other. Moreover, all nodes
have equivalent power transmission capabilities; that is, all
have equivalent transmission range. It is also assumed that
the consumed power during the simulation time does not
impact the transmission range of nodes. This assumption is
made to keep the focus of our work on security issues and not
on power control. To demonstrate the power consumption
under the proposed scheme, we assume that the transmission
and reception power are 1000 times more than the processing
power per transmission, reception, or monitoring operation
[9] (in our computation we used 1 Watt, 1 milli-watt; resp.).
In this work, we care more about the overall performance
and not the absolute values of the consumed power as the
focus here is on securing our routes. RF channel is assumed
to be ideal and collision free. Moreover, we assume a static
WSN. Mobile WSN can be an interesting subject of a future
research work.
Regarding communication discipline, we assume that
each node in the system can initiate a routing operation.
Thus, any node can be a source. Moreover, any node can be a
destination for that node. The selection of source-destination
pair is done randomly.
2.2. Attack Model. The existence of the reputation system
does not imply a complete solution for all security problems.
Our proposed solution tries to solve a particular security
problem that is related to nodal behavior in the routing oper-
ation, as has been discussed earlier. Thus, some reasonable
assumptions are made to make the work more focused on
our problem.
(i) The system assumes always suspicious nodes. This
means that a node cannot be fully trusted. Every node
is assumed to have a minimum risk value that can be
encountered if that node is used as a router.
(ii) The system assumes collusion-free attacks. The
design of the system, however, can be easily modified
to handle collusion based attacks since we adopt
modular design. Changes need to be done in the
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rating component. This can be considered for future
work.
(iii) The system treats only one type of behavior related
attacks, that is, nonforwarding attack. In this attack,
when a malicious node receives a packet to forward,
it drops this packet with a certain probability that will
represent its actual risk value.
(iv) The system assumes honesty in treating information
exchange about nodes energy levels or risk values.
Honesty can be accounted for in the rating compo-
nent. However, we left this aspect for future studies.
2.3. Reputation System Model. Our reputation system con-
sists of three main components, that is, monitoring compo-
nent, rating component, and response component.
2.3.1. Monitoring Component. The monitoring component
observes packet forwarding events. A monitoring node will
apply a watchdog mechanism by which it will be continu-
ously monitoring other neighboring nodes for possible non
forwarding attacks. When a misbehaving event is detected,
it is counted and stored until an update time Tupdate is due.
Then a report is sent to the rating component, CRATER.
2.3.2. Rating Component: CRATER. The rating component,
CRATER, evaluates the amount of risk an observed node
would provide for the routing operation. The risk value is
a quantity that represents previous misbehaving activities
that a malicious node (a node that drops packet) obtained.
This value is used as an expectation for how much risk
would be suﬀered by selecting that malicious node as a
router. It is calculated based on first hand information
(FHI) and second hand information (SHI). FHI is achieved
by the direct observation done by the node of concern.
Risk values are updated based on the FHI every time a
new misbehavior report is received from the monitoring
component. Moreover, if an observed node shows an idle
behavior during a certain period, its risk value is reduced. A
monitor also updates the risk values of its neighbors by SHI
received periodically from some announcers.
2.3.3. Response Component. The response component in
our system is a trust aware version of the GEAR routing
protocol [10]. Our protocol incorporates risk values com-
puted by rating component along with distance and energy
information to choose the best next hop for the routing
operation. A node will only try to avoid malicious nodes.
We call this as a defensive approach. A future possible
enhancement is to allow a node not to forward packets
initiated from a malicious node as a response. However, we
are not considering such a mechanism in this current work.
3. Routing Events Monitoring
In monitoring operation, a node will record any new packet
transmission that it can overhear. The following algorithm is
used to identify misbehavior events.
(i) Record each overheard packet transmission.
(ii) Search for a match for that packet in a monitoring
queue.
(iii) If a match is found, delete the packet from the
monitoring queue. A match here corresponds to a
match in source ID, destination ID, and previous hop
ID.
(iv) If the match is not found, then if the next hop
node in the packet is a neighbor, that is, it can be
monitored, add the recorded packet as a new entry to
the monitoring queue; otherwise, ignore the packet.
(v) If an update period Tupdate passes, clear the moni-
toring queue. This step provides a maximum period
(Tupdate) allowed to validate that a node has for-
warded a packet.
(vi) After each Tupdate, report the number of misbehaving
events for each monitored node to the rating compo-
nent.
4. Rating Component: CRATER
In this work, our proposed rating technique is called
Cautious Rating for Trust Enabled Routing (CRATER).
Basically, this technique identifies three rating factors: first
hand information (FHI), second hand information (SHI),
and neutral behavior period (NBP). FHI is the information
gathered by direct monitoring and interaction between the
monitoring and monitored node. SHI is the opinion of
other nodes about a monitored node. NBP is a period
during which a node is not doing any routing activity. The
new contribution in CRATER is its mathematical approach
that is used to rate nodes based on what we call cautious
assumptions.
4.1. Cautious Assumptions. Rating methodology proposed in
CRATER assumes what we call “the cautious assumptions.”
These assumptions are the following.
(i) Pessimistic start: the default status of a node joining
the WSN network is to be untrustworthy. However,
its reputation, or what we will call later the risk value,
will not be at the extreme level.
(ii) Unreliable SHI: a node tries to be as much indepen-
dent from SHI as possible to avoid dishonesty issues.
(iii) Rejecting good news: announcing “good news” about
other nodes in SHI can be a trial from the announcer
to relieve itself from routing duties and put the
burden on the others or it can be thought as
collusion between the announcer and an attacker.
Thus, nodes are not interested in hearing good
news. On the other hand, “bad news” is very much
welcomed. The diﬀerentiation between these good or
bad announcements is realized by a threshold.
(iv) Local interest: this means that a node is only inter-
ested in rating its immediate neighbors.
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In CRATER, each node rates its neighbor by assigning
a risk value to the corresponding monitored node. The risk
value of node j assigned by node i, ri, j is defined as a quantity
that represents how much risk the node i will encounter
when it uses node j as a next hop to route its packets. This
value ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 represents the minimum
risk and 1 represents the maximum risk. The reputation of
node j as per node i is then computed as
repi, j = 1− ri, j . (1)
CRATER operation is based on rating the nodes on
the risk notion. Each node evaluates the risk values of its
neighbors and takes the proper action based on the values
it obtains. Risk values calculations are aﬀected by the three
factors, that is, FHI, SHI and NBP. Each node in the system
continuously and periodically updates the risk values of its
neighbors based on the information collected during these
update periods. The general algorithm that a node i follows
to rate its neighbor j is what follows.
(i) node i monitors node j for the duration of the update
period, Tupdate.
(ii) at the end of each update period, do the following:
(a) calculate ri, j,FHI using the new FHI
(b) update the old risk value, ri, j,old using the new
calculated ri, j,FHI to get ri, j
(c) calculate the ri, j,SHI using the SHI
(d) update ri, j using the ri, j,SHI
(e) update ri, j if neutral behavior periods are
realized.
4.2. Rating on First Hand Information. During an update
period, node i monitors its neighbor j. Based on the outputs
of this monitoring operation, the value of ri, j,FHI is calculated.
All risk evaluation formulas are based on the frequency of
misbehaviors (the number of packets that are dropped over
a period of time regardless of the total transmitted packets,
assuming error free channel). Adopting such approach
instead of considering the rate (i.e., dropped/transmitted) as
a measure of trustworthiness will prevent forwarder nodes
from taking advantage of their status and starts dropping
more packets and eventually, it deceives the overall system.
This is another interesting feature of our reputation system.
Let us define the following quantities
(i) ci, j : the occurrence count of node j misbehavior that
is monitored by node i.
(ii) Tupdate: the length of the update period during which
the misbehavior of node j monitored by i occurs.
(iii) fi, j : the frequency of node j misbehavior that is






(iv) fmax: a maximum misbehavior frequency value that
can be tolerated by the reputation system. In fact,
fmax can be used to account for false positives, that
is, drops that are not related to attacks. In some
practical scenarios, if the channel is known to have
lots of collisions or if we allow node mobility in the
system, fmax can be used to tolerate these factors.
For example, if we estimate that a channel would
have a collision rate of 2 packets/second; fmax should
be designed to be greater than 2 since we know
that we will encounter some drops due to collisions.
However, modeling fmax with these factors requires
much more in-depth analysis. In this work, we just
focus on looking at its eﬀect as an input to the rating
system.
Given the previous parameters, the risk value ri, j,FHI






However, ri, j,FHI in (3) can be greater than 1. Thus, to
ensure that ri, j,FHI ∈ [0, 1], the quantity fi, j / fmax should be








In fact, the case where fi, j / fmax > 1 indicates a serious
misbehavior event that cannot be tolerated by the reputation
system, since fmax represents the maximum tolerable misbe-
havior. In that case, the node will be assigned the maximum
risk value, that is, 1. Now, once ri, j,FHI is obtained, node i
should update the old risk value ri, j,old.
It is well known that the trust is originally a social value
and it is a very complex issue. Hence, the proposed approach
tried to tackle the trust problem thoroughly via identifying
the diﬀerent cases and find a way to characterize each case
uniquely and then propose a method to assess the risk/trust
properly. In this work, CRATER updates ri, j,old diﬀerently
based on the value of ri, j,FHI. We can consider the following
three cases.
Case 1 (ri, j,FHI = 0). If ri, j,FHI is equal to zero, it means that
node j has proved a good behavior during the update period
(Remember that if node j was idle, it will be considered as
a neutral behavior period and ri, j,FHI will not have a value,
hence, no update to ri, j will be done at this step). In this case
of ri, j,FHI = 0, ri, j,old should be updated to have a new value
smaller than the old one because node j has proved a good
behavior . The updated value of ri, j will be recalculated as





where θi, j is a reduction factor∈ [0, θmax] and θmax is a global
maximum reduction factor allowed by the whole reputation
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system and θmax < 1. We can notice that θi, j diﬀers according
to the monitored node. The reason is that θi, j should reflect
the trust relationship between node i and j, that is, Trusti, j .
We define the trustworthiness of a node j with respect to
i as follows:




where ri,th is the maximum risk level a node can exhibit
beyond which it cannot build a trust relationship with node
i. If Trusti, j = 1, node j is fully trusted. If 0 ≤ Trusti, j < 1,
node j is trusted with some risk as Trusti, j decreases towards
0. When Trusti, j ≤ 0, j is never trusted.
Given this trust notion, θi, j in (5) can be calculated as
follows:
θi, j = θmaxTrusti, j . (7)
Since the reputation system assumes an always suspicious
environment, ri, j cannot reduce indefinitely. Thus, a reduc-
tion will be allowed as long as the new value of ri, j will be
greater than or equal to a minimum allowed value rmin. We
can notice here that the better the reputation of a node (i.e.,
the lower its risk value is), the more reduction it will acquire.
If ri, j,FHI is not equal to zero, we look at the following
other two cases.
Case 2 (ri, j,FHI > ri, j,old). In this case, the new risk value will
be updated and biased to the current value, that is, ri, j,FHI.
This is to punish the misbehaving node according to how
much it misbehaves more than the expectation of staying
at ri, j,old. The update methodology used here in CRATER is
similar to the average exponential weighting. The equation
used to calculate the new risk ri, j,new given the old value ri, j,old
and the current FHI risk value ri, j,FHI is as follows:
ri, j,new = λri, j,FHI + (1− λ)ri, j,old. (8)
Here, λ is a real number ∈ (0.5, 1] that represents
a preference parameter to indicate the importance of the
history of FHI embedded in ri, j,old and the current ri, j,FHI. In
CRATER, λ is a tunable design parameter that depends on
the diﬀerence between the current and old risk values, that
is,
rdiﬀ = ri, j,FHI − ri, j,old. (9)
If the diﬀerence between the two risk values is insignifi-
cant, λ should be moderate to the value 0.5. As the diﬀerence
increases, λ should increase because the current risk value is
more and it predicts more about the future than the history.
So, λ is modeled by the following equation:
λ = 0.5(1 + rdiﬀ). (10)
Case 3 (ri, j,FHI ≤ ri, j,old). Here, although j has equal or better
current observation results than previous observations, it is
still misbehaving. Thus, we still should punish node j and
increase its risk value. However, this time the increase will
depend on a discouragement and attraction strategy. If a
node has a low risk value, it will be punished more compared
to a node with higher risk. This is to discourage any further
trials from the lower risk node. In the same time, the higher
risk node will be attracted to behave better in the future
by increasing its risk value slightly. This will not aﬀect the
rating fairness because the higher risk node is already in a
very serious situation and increasing its risk value greatly or
slightly will not have a significant diﬀerence.
Mathematically, the increment of the risk value should
decrease as ri, j,old increases. Since ri, j,old ∈ [0, 1], we can relate







where ε0 is a value representing the relation constant.
However, it is better to reflect this constant in the lights of
the old and current FHI so that if the current value is very
close to the old value, the increment should increase. So, ε0
should be related to the ratio between the current and the
old risk values. Moreover, if the current value itself is large,
the increment should also be more. Thus ε0 should be also
related to the current value. As a result, ε0 can be modeled
by:





















− r2i, j,FHI. (13)
Notice that ε is guaranteed to be always positive since
ri, j,old < 1. Finally, the updated value ri, j,new is the old value
incremented by ε
ri, j,new = ri, j,old + ε = ri, j,old +
r2i, j,FHI
ri, j,old
− r2i, j,FHI. (14)
4.2.1. Discussion. The proposed approach as mentioned
in several places in the paper is a suspicious approach.
Therefore, when a node tries to show “good” behavior, the
system will be suspicious and its new risk value gets worse.
On the same direction, when the node’s FHI is higher than
the old value, its new risk value will be higher but not with
the same rate as the case where the FHI is greater than the old
risk value (i.e., Case 2). On the other hand, the trust theorem
still applies but not immediately. The node should show this
“good” behavior for suﬃcient time and then its risk value will
get lower (more trusted).
4.3. Rating on Second Hand Information. Due to the assump-
tion of rejecting good news, accepting SHI is governed by a
threshold value. When a node k wants to announce to node
i the risk value it obtained about j, it sends its current first
hand observation risk value, that is, ri, j,FHI. When node i
receives rk, j,FHI, it will compare it with the SHI acceptance
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threshold, that is, rk, j,SHI. If rk, j,FHI > rth,SHI, it will accept this
SHI announcement. Otherwise, it will ignore it.
When node i receives all SHI regarding node j, it
calculates the corresponding rating of node j based on SHI,
that is, ri, j,SHI. This step should account for the concept of
accuracy of the reported information. Accuracy is the term
used to represent how much a reported information deviates
from the actual reading. There are many ways to account for
accuracy when calculating ri, j,SHI. One approach that we use
in CRATER is to take the average of the reported SHI. Thus,






where K is the number of accepted reporters or announcers.
If K = 0, no SHI update will be done.
Once ri, j,SHI is calculated, the risk value ri, j will be
updated to get ri, j,new by considering the old value ri, j,old
and ri, j,SHI. The update methodology will follow a similar
approach to the exponential average weighting approach by
the following equation:
ri, j,new = ωri, j,old + (1− ω)ri, j,SHI. (16)
Here, ω is a real number ∈ [0, 1] that represents a preference
parameter to indicate the importance of the history of the
node rating and the SHI. In our system, ω is a tunable design
parameter that depends on the diﬀerence between the old
rating risk value and SHI risk value, that is,
rdiﬀ = ri, j,old − ri, j,SHI. (17)
If the diﬀerence between the two risk values is insignifi-
cant, ω should be moderate to the value 0.5. As the diﬀerence
increases positively or negatively, ω should increase because
we want to rely on the old experience due to the unreliable
SHI assumption, which is one of the previously mentioned
cautious assumptions. Since we want the preference to be
always associated with the old rating over the SHI, we
consider the absolute value of the diﬀerence rather than the
signed diﬀerence. So, ω can be modeled by the following
equation:
ω = 0.5(1 + |rdiﬀ|). (18)
4.3.1. Example. Let us assume ri, j,old = 0.1 and ri, j,SHI = 0.4,
then using (16), ri, j,new = 0.205. If however ri, j,SHI = 0.9,
then ri, j,new = 0.18. This appears as a paradoxical; how can
a very negative SHI (risk of 0.9) have a smaller impact than
a less negative SHI (risk of 0.4)? This issue can be explained
as follows. In our approach, we do not want to make SHI
to deviate our measurements far from old values. Therefore,
the SHI measurements that deviate new risk measurements
far away from the old ones are not well respected. Using such
approach should minimize the bad mouthing nodes.
4.4. Rating on Neutral Behavior. When node j is observed
by i for n consecutive update periods to be idle in its
behavior, node i will give node j a chance to be more trusted
by reducing its current risk value. A node is considered
to be in idle behavior if it does not perform any routing
operation. The reduction procedure follows exactly the
same methodology explained in rating based on FHI when
ri, j,FHI = 0. The only diﬀerence here is that in the case of
neutral behavior the update is done after we observe such
behavior during n consecutive update periods whereas it
is done immediately after an update period in the case of
ri, j,FHI = 0. The choice of n is a design parameter that
depends on how much a network is tolerable against attacks.
High values of n mean that we are not willing to forgive
malicious nodes quickly.
4.5. CRATER Evaluation Using RESISTOR. As any rating
mechanism, CRATER needs to be evaluated to see how var-
ious rating factors aﬀect trust evolution and risk evaluation.
One approach is to see how the risk value is evolving during
network operation. In this work, we enhance this evolution
mechanism using a new technique that we call REputaion
Systems-Independent Scale for Trust On Routing (RESISTOR).
In RESISTOR, we introduce a new metric called the
resistance metric. The resistance between node i and a
malicious node j in the direction from i to j is denoted
by RESi, j . It is defined as the ratio of the risk value ri, j






Thus, a good reputation system must provide high
resistance. A perfect reputation system should provide an
infinite resistance since Pi, j = 0.
For reputation systems evaluation purpose, RESITOR
works as follows.
(i) For each node i in the network, do the following steps
at the end of each update period, Tupdate:
(a) at the end of each update period, node i
computes ri, j for all neighbors,
(b) at the end of each update period, node i knows
how many packets have been forwarded to its
neighbor, j,
(c) for each malicious neighbor, node i will com-
pute its resistance against that malicious node j
as
RESi, j =
ri, j − ri,min
Pi, j
, (20)
where ri,min is the minimum risk value among its neighbors
and Pi, j /= 0. Please notice that when ri,min = ri, j , the node i
is either completely surrounded by malicious nodes or it has
only one neighbor who is malicious. In either case, if Pi, j /= 0,
RESi, j = 0 which reflects that i is not able to resist node j.
(i) If Pi, j = 0; i will not compute RESi, j . This is because
j will be considered as if it does not exist.
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(ii) Compute the average resistance of node i against its
neighborhood RESi,avg as the arithmetic mean of all
RESi, j , that is,
RESi, j =
∑
∀ j RESi, j
m
, (21)
where m is the number of malicious neighbors and j is
neighboring malicious nodes. If m = 0, RESi,avg is set to 0.
(iii) Repeat all the previous steps, but this time assume
that ri, j is the expected theoretical value ri, j,theoritical.
In the case of nonforwarding attack, like in this
work, we can model ri, j,theoritical as the probability of
dropping a packet. Compute then the corresponding
RESi,avg,theoritical. Notice that Pi, j is the same in the
theoretical or actual calculations. The rational behind
this step is to weigh the short-term resistance value to
the long-term resistance value and this what we called
Resistance Figure.





(v) Compute the average resistance figure of all nodes





Number of nodes in the network
. (23)
(vi) Plot the obtained values of RESavg,fig versus their
corresponding update times and analyze the behavior
of the curve.
4.6. Validation Experiments. Before analyzing out reputation
system performance, we need to make sure that CRATER is
working as required. Thus, we provide some validation tests
to investigate following points
(i) The eﬀective role of FHI rating, SHI rating, and
neutral behavior related rating. The purpose is to see
how much these factors aﬀect CRATER.
(ii) The eﬀect of the frequency of rating updates, that
is to see if very frequent updates can improve the
resistance significantly or not.
(iii) The eﬀect of changing some threshold parameters on
the resistance of the system so that better choices can
be adopted for those that provide higher resistance.
Table 1 summarizes all experiments’ parameters.
Figure 1 shows the resistance figure for CRATER versus
time for two cases. In the first case, the thick curve, CRATER






















Figure 1: The resistance figure for FHI with and without neutral
behavior period (NBP).
dotted curve, CRATER rates nodes on FHI and allows a
reduction of the risk level of nodes if a neutral behavior
period (NBP) is observed for 10 consecutive update periods.
The figure shows that when CRATER implements FHI
only, the resistance is higher than the case when it allows
for NBP. The reason is that when NBP is allowed, its main
role is to provide a chance for those idle malicious nodes
to be more engaged in the routing operations by reducing
their risk values. The lower resistance of that case proves that
CRATER works as expected in terms of NBP.
Another important point to note here is the curve
convergence issue. We can see that the curves are strictly
increasing in a nonlinear trend with time. If the curves will
converge, they have to converge at a value close to one, as
explained earlier. However, it seems from curves behavior
that the curve is very slowly converging since it increases
from 0.45 at t = 0 to 0.6 at t = 2000 seconds in case of
FHI. This slow convergence is due to the choice of rating
parameters, as will be discussed later.
In Figure 2, we are studying the eﬀect of adding SHI
as a rating factor in CRATER. The same rating parameters
used for FHI in Figure 1 are used here. The left side of the
figure shows the resistance in compressed scale, while the
right hand side shows the same figure magnified on a detailed
scale.
Before analyzing the curves, we should highlight the role
of SHI in CRATER. SHI should assist in rating a certain node
in a way that makes everyone has similar opinion about that
node. To illustrate this point, assume that nodes A and B
are interested in rating node C. Assume also that initially,
rA,C = 0.9 and rB,C = 0.5. If SHI is not allowed, A and B may
still have the same gap in their ratings for node C. However,
when SHI is allowed, A and B will exchange their knowledge
about C and adjust their ratings accordingly. Ultimately, both
of them will have risk values on C that are close to each other.
Now, back to Figure 2, we can see in the left side that the
resistance is almost constant. A constant resistance implies
a convergence situation, which should happen when the
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Table 1: Simulation parameters for CRATER experiments.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
fmax
5 dps (drops per second)
if it is not changing as
per the simulation
objective
Simulation period 2000 seconds
ri,th 0.9 Number of nodes 100
Default risk value 0.5 Deployment random
Minimum risk value 0.1 Network size 100∗100 squared units
SHI acceptance
threshold
0.5 Node transmission range 15 units
Tupdate
5 seconds if it is not




0.01 if it is not changing






Mean arrival rate 1 pps Attacker percentage 50%
Mean service rate 500 pps Attackers deployment Random
Queuing model M/M/1 NBP consecutive periods 10 periods
Routing protocol GEAR Pi, j 1
resistance figure is equal to 1. However, the curve shows
that this convergence happens at a value around 0.4475,
which is much less than 1. This can happen only if FHI is
suppressed by another factor that is trying to reduce FHI-
related resistance, while at the same time; it tries to keep the
ratings at a “global opinion” level. This is exactly what SHI
role is supposed to be. This eﬀect of SHI is much clearer in
the right side of Figure 2 where we can see how the resistance
curve is alternating around an average of 0.4475 as if SHI
is competing FHI in a trial to keep the resistance around
that value. The convergence at the value 0.4475 is not the
ideal case. Where to converge is actually related to the rating
parameters.
Figure 3 shows the resistance curve for CRATER consid-
ering all rating factors, that is, FHI, SHI, and NBP. The same
parameters used for Figures 1 and 2 are used here. The left
side provides a compressed scale while the right one gives
the same curve in a detailed scale. If we compare Figure 2
with Figure 3, we can notice that there is no big diﬀerence
between the two situations. This is because Figure 3 diﬀers
from Figure 2 by the addition of NBP in rating calculations.
As we have seen in the analysis of Figure 1, NBP does
not aﬀect the FHI rating very much. As a result, NBP
has transparent eﬀect on CRATER under these settings and
conditions.
Figure 4 studies the impact of the frequency of rating
updates on the system resistance. The figure studies the
resistance of CRATER considering FHI. Three cases are
provided here, that is, when the updates are done every 2
seconds, 5 seconds, and 10 seconds. We can notice that as
the updates are done more frequently the resistance gets
higher values and converges faster towards 1. For example,
with the updates done every 2 seconds, the resistance is 0.8
at t = 1000 seconds, whereas it is equal to 0.45 when they
are done every 10 seconds. Although the rate of attack is
still the same, with frequent updates, CRATER punishes the
malicious nodes in smaller increments in their risk values,
but more frequently. This accumulates at a larger risk value
as compared with less frequent updates. As a result, fast
convergence and high resistance can be achieved with more
frequent updates. However, remember that we are working
in WSN environment where this can be an unnecessary
overhead that consumes resources.
Figure 5 analyzes the eﬀect of varying fmax on the resis-
tance of CRATER as FHI rating is concerned. Remember that
fmax was defined as the maximum misbehavior frequency


























































































Figure 3: The RESISTOR curve for CRATER with all rating factors, that is, FHI, SHI, and neutral behavior: (a) compressed scale, (b) detailed
scale.
value that can be tolerated by the reputation system. So,
when we decrease the value of fmax we should expect a very
sensitive system that will assign much higher risk values for
malicious nodes as compared to high fmax value case. Thus,
we expect to have higher resistance with low values of fmax.
Figure 5 shows that as we decrease fmax from 10 dropped
packets per second (dps) to 0.5 dps, the resistance is improv-
ing in terms of the convergence value and the convergence
speed as well. For example, with fmax = 10 dps, the resistance
is very slowly increasing and it is operating around 0.43,
whereas with fmax = 0.5 dps, the system very early jumps to
0.85 at around t = 500 seconds. Although the fmax = 0.5 dps
provides better resistance, it can cause a situation where
we overestimate the misbehaving nodes. In such cases, the
resistance may exceed 1. This can happen, for example, if
the attacker drops the packet with probability less than 1. In
that case, RESi,avg,theoritical can be less than RESi,avg due to fmax.
However, in this section, we are studying the non forwarding
attack with dropping probability = 1. Thus, the system
does not overestimate nodes’ behavior as they are all at
their maximum risk value when calculating RESi,avg,theoritical.
Thus, RESi,avg,theoritical will be always greater than or equal
to RESi,avg, and, consequently, the resistance figure will be
always less than or equal to 1.
5. Response
Once a node obtains risk information about its neighbors,
a routing decision should be made regarding its future
transaction. In our system, we modify GEAR protocol, which
is geographic and energy aware routing protocol, to have
the additional feature of trust awareness. Trust awareness
is achieved by the rating functionality that will feed the
routing protocol with the trust metric, which is basically the
risk values, ri, j . The risk value ri, j , as discussed earlier, is a
quantity that reflects, to some extent, the expectation that
a node j will not forward the packet received from node i,
assuming non forwarding attack.
The risk value metric, along with distance and energy
metrics, is used to compute a learned cost function for
each neighbor. The concerned node, then, makes the routing
decision by selecting the neighbor of the lowest cost. The











1− β)[αd( j,R) + (1− α)e( j,R)],
(24)
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Figure 4: Studying the eﬀect of update periods frequency on the
resistance figure considering FHI factor.
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Figure 5: Studying the eﬀect of fmax on the resistance figure
considering FHI factor.
where
(i) t( j,R) is the trust-aware cost of using the node j by
node i as a router to the destination R. ri, j is the risk
value that node i so far knows about node j.
(ii) d( j,R) is the normalized distance from j to R (the
distance from j to R divided by the distance from the
farthest neighbor of i to R).
(iii) e( j,R) is the so far normalized consumed energy at
node j which is announced periodically every Tupdate.
(iv) α is a tunable parameter ∈ [0, 1] to give more
preference to distance or energy.
(v) [αd( j,R) + (1 − α)e( j,R)] is the GEAR component
of the routing decision.
(vi) β is a tunable parameter ∈ [0, 1] to give more or less
preference to trust as opposed to other resources.
If we are concerned about trust more than other
resources, β should be close to 1. When β equals 1, the trust-
aware cost will consider only the trust part of (24) and the
next hop will be the most trusted one. Setting β to zero, how-
ever, turns the protocol to pure GEAR without any security
considerations from the routing protocol perspective.
Diﬀerent than GEAR, our routing operation involves
only packet forwarding and does not implement dissemina-
tion. This is because in the dissemination phase in GEAR,
packets are intended to be forwarded to all nodes in the
target region. However, when we consider trust awareness,
a misbehaving node should not be given a chance to have the
packet since it will not forward the packet. Thus, our protocol
continues to forward packets based on the routing decisions
made by the learned cost function.
Finally, regarding the problem of void regions, which is
the case when a node finds itself the closest to the destination
among its neighbors, there is no change in the escaping
operation proposed by GEAR. The only diﬀerence here is
that the reason of being in a void region can be related to
the existence of misbehaving nodes in the proximity of the
node of interest.
6. Reputation System Resistance Evaluation
In this part of the work, our simulation experiments are set
to study the impact of adopting CRATER as a monitoring
procedure on the performance on the reputation system.
This will be done by studying the evolution of the resistance
figure after allowing real interaction between CRATER and
our trust-aware routing. The main diﬀerence between these
experiments and the ones presented in Section 4.6 is that
the system was trust unaware in Section 4.6. Thus, packet
flow was governed by trust aware decision. Whereas in this
section, our routing protocol is trust aware. Thus, rating and
packet flow will be definitely impacted by routing decisions.
Simulation settings and parameters are provided in Table 2.
In this simulation, we will focus on the eﬀect of Tupdate and
fmax since they represent the key parameters in risk and
resistance evolution.
6.1. Varying Tupdate. Tupdate represents the periodicity of
information update regarding cost functions and risk eval-
uation. The more frequent the system is updated, the faster
the system can reach the actual risk values of nodes. However,
since our trust aware version of GEAR makes relative routing
decisions, system performance in terms of delivery ratio
(number of successfully delivered packets/total generated
packets) cannot be directly related to Tupdate values. This is
because each node will ultimately reach the same conclusion
about its neighbors in terms of who is more risky than
others. If this conclusion is reached at very early stages of
the simulation time, the eﬀect of Tupdate will not appear
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on routing performance. The investigation of this problem,
however, is left for a future work.
In this part of simulation analysis, we are interested in
seeing how responsive is our reputation system in relation
to Tupdate variation as well as inspecting the stability issues.
CRATER parameters used in this experiment are presented
in Table 3.
Figure 6 shows the number of dropped packets per a
previous Tupdate versus simulation time. We can notice that
as Tupdate increases, the dropped packets increase, which is an
intuitive result. However, what is important for this analysis
is the time at which the number of dropped packets starts
to stabilize around the average. The simulation shows the
following observation: (after applying initial data deletion
technique).
It is very noticeable that as the system gets updated very
frequently, that is, as Tupdate gets smaller, the system reaches
a stable state much faster, as shown in Table 4.
Moreover, the resistance figure in Figure 7 shows that as
Tupdate gets smaller, the stable value of the resistance figure
increases. The increase in the resistance figure should be
analyzed using the resistance definition, that is, RESi, j =
(ri, j − ri,min)/Pi, j . Now, RESi, j gets higher as ri, j increases
and Pi, j decreases. However, ri, j is mostly aﬀected by FHI
calculations as, ri, j,FHI = fi, j / fmax, where, fi, j is given by
fi, j = ci, j /Tupdate. However, the ratio ci, j /Tupdate is fixed and
not aﬀected by Tupdate values for the assumption of fixed
rate, noncollusion attack. Thus, ri, j is almost unaﬀected by
Tupdate for initial interactions. On the other hand, Pi, j gets
smaller with Tupdate as it is evident from Figure 6. Thus,
RESi, j becomes higher with smaller values of Tupdate.
The benefit of having high values of resistance is not
reflected on the performance of routing protocol, as we
explained earlier. However, this trend of resistance figure
with Tupdate values has an important application, if we
adopt oﬀensive and dismissal response mechanisms. For
example, we can apply thresholds to start punishing nodes
based on reaching certain resistance values by the whole
system. If we have a sever situation where we require fast
punishment and critical threshold values, small values of
Tupdate like 2 seconds will be the best choice. Of course,
this will be at the expense of more overhead, which is
beyond the scope of the work objective. Since our routing
protocol does not implement such advanced mechanisms,
and since changing Tupdate does not have a direct impact
on routing performance, the best choice for Tupdate is the
one that provides the least overhead, that is, Tupdate =
10 seconds. However, in the remaining simulations we use
Tupdate = 5 seconds for the sake of consistency with other
simulations.
One last observation to notice here is that the value of
the resistance figure in these experiments can exceed 1. This
is actually due to the fact that we are allowing the attacker
to drop packets with probabilities less than 1. As explained
earlier in Section 4.6, this leads to overestimating the risk
level of nodes. However, considering cautious assumptions,
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Figure 6: Dropped packets per Tupdate for diﬀerent Tupdate values.
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Figure 7: Resistance figure under diﬀerent values of Tupdate.
6.2. Varying fmax. For experiments regarding varying fmax,
we used the same parameters in Table 3 except that Tupdate is
set to 5 seconds and fmax varies as 1, 5, and 10.
As in the analysis of Tupdate impact on routing perfor-
mance, the same argument is applied here with the variation
of fmax (maximum misbehavior frequency value that can be
tolerated by the reputation system). Routing performance
in terms of delivery ratio is not influenced by changing
fmax because the concept of routing decision relativity is
still maintained. Figure 8 clearly indicates that aspect since it
shows that the number of dropped packets is the same during
the simulation time irrespective of fmax value.
However, as fmax decreases RESi, j increases. That is why
the resistance figure becomes higher as fmax decreases in
Figure 9. Again, these absolute values of the resistance under
the lights of fmax can be utilized to design threshold for
advanced response techniques as discussed earlier in the
analysis of Tupdate. For example, we can set the value of fmax
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Table 2: Simulation parameters for repuation system experemints.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Number of nodes 100 nodes Queuing model M/M/1
Network dimensions






Transmission range 15 units Simulation duration 1000 seconds




1 Watt per reception,




Mean arrival rate 1 pps Update strategy Periodic, every 5 seconds














% of attackers 50% Attackers deployment Random
Table 3: Simulation parameters for Tupdate variation experiments.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Tupdate 2, 5, 10 seconds fmax 10
% of attackers 50% Simulation time 1000 seconds
Number of nodes 100 nodes Attackers deployment Random
NMA PON1 = PON2 = 1 β 0.5






2 seconds 66 seconds 61
5 seconds 210 seconds 113
10 seconds 330 seconds 195
to 1 to have high resistance in sever applications in order to
apply isolation mechanisms in an oﬀensive response.
6.3. The Eﬀect of Attacker Population in the Network. It is
trivial to conclude that as the attackers’ percentage increases
in the system, the delivery ratio degrades. However, the pur-
pose of this simulation is to show how much improvement is
expected by being exposed to less number of attackers under
the lights of various values of β.
In Figure 10, we tested three attackers’ percentages, that
is, 10, 30 and 50%. We did not go beyond 50% since
after that the network is mostly owned by the attacking
community. Two important observations can be extracted
from Figure 10.
(i) The impact of β (the trust aware preference param-
eter) on delivery ratio starts to appear significantly




































Figure 8: Packet dropping per Tupdate for diﬀerent fmax values.
provides equal preference for all factors in routing
cost function with α = 0.5. This implies that any good
system design should consider β values greater than
1/3, irrespective of the attackers’ percentage.
















































Figure 10: Delivery ratio with various percentages of attackers.
(ii) The delivery ratio improves significantly by reduc-
ing the percentage of attackers in the system. For
example, at β = 0.9, the delivery ratio improves
from 0.49 to 0.9. Since WSN can be dynamically
redeployed, one trick can be used here is to decrease
the number of attacker by deploying more “fresh”
nodes. However, this guarantees that better nodes
will exist in the vicinity of other nodes and they will
be more qualified to be routers as opposed to the
malicious ones.
Coming to resistance analysis, Figure 11 shows an inter-
esting phenomenon of our RESISTOR tool. That is, the more
exposure to attacks the system is, the more resistant the
system should be. When the number of attackers is high,
more packets will be dropped initially. This is because the
alternative routers are also malicious. This implies that the
victim node will have better updates on the risk value as it
will experience more interactions with malicious nodes. As a
result, the risk values will get higher. In a later time, yet not
so much late, fewer packets will be delivered per malicious






















Figure 11: Resistance figure with various percentages of attackers
in the integrated system.
ultimately we will have high risk values with few delivered
packets per malicious node that implies high resistance.
However, although we deliver fewer packets per malicious
node in high percentage of attackers, the collective drops
due to the population of the attackers sums up to larger
drop counts than what is encountered when we have less
percentage of attackers where more packets are mistakenly
delivered to malicious nodes. This is evident from the
delivery ratio results in Figure 10.
7. Related Work
In literature, several famous work deals with behavioral
related routing security problems using diﬀerent approaches.
For example, Intrusion-tolerant Routing in Wireless Sensor
Networks (INSENS) [11] constructs tree-structured routing
for wireless sensor networks (WSNs). It aims to tolerate
damage caused by an intruder who has compromised
deployed sensor nodes and is intent on injecting, modify-
ing, or blocking packets. INSENS incorporates distributed
lightweight security mechanisms, including one-way hash
chains and nested keyed message authentication codes to
defend against routing attacks such as wormhole attack.
Adapting to WSN characteristics, the design of INSENS also
pushes complexity away from resource-poor sensor nodes
towards resource-rich base stations.
Another work is SeFER [12], which stands for secure,
flexible, and eﬃcient routing protocol for sensor networks.
It is based on random key predistribution mechanism. This
mechanism aims to provide an easy way for managing the
keys in WSN without using public key cryptography. The
protocol assumes nonsymmetric communication architec-
ture in which a tree of sensor nodes delivers information to
a controller according to an inquiry sent into the network.
Two nodes may communicate indirectly, but securely over
a multiple hop path where each pair of nodes on this path
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shares a common key. The protocol provides the methods for
nodes to securely share their keys and communicate directly
so that the eﬃciency of communication is increased.
The two previously mentioned protocols are crypto-
based solutions. They can successfully fight against attacks
in which an intruder falsifies his identity to be a relay for
the source such as sybil attack. However, other attacks like
selective forwarding, blackhole and HELLO flooding [13]
are still possible especially when the attack is performed by
an insider node or a node compromised by an intruder.
Moreover, any misbehavior due to selfishness or faulty
operational nodes cannot be prevented or even detected.
The authors of [8, 14] introduced a mechanism that
includes two parts: watchdog and pathrater. The watchdog
is the monitoring part that is designed to be responsible for
detecting only non forwarding misbehavior. This is accom-
plished by overhearing the transmission of the next node.
The node thus is assumed to be in a continuous promiscuous
mode. When the attack is detected, the observing node
informs the source of the concerned path.
The pathrater is the component used for reputation.
Ratings are kept about every node in the network based
on its routing activity and they are updated periodically.
Nodes select routes with the highest average node rating.
Thus, nodes can avoid misbehaving nodes in their routes as
a response. However, misbehaving nodes can still transmit
their packets as there is no punishment mechanism adopted
here. Moreover, no SHI propagation view is considered
which limits the cooperativeness among nodes.
In SORI (Secure and Objective Reputation-Based Incen-
tive Scheme for Ad Hoc Networks) [15], the authors target
only the non forwarding attack, as we have implemented in
this work. SORI monitors the number of forwarded packets
from neighborhood and the number of forwarded packets
to neighborhood. Reputation ratings are then acquired by
computing the ratio between the two numbers with a con-
sideration for the confidence in the rating proportional to the
number of packets that are initially requested for forwarding.
SHI is delivered only to the immediate neighbors. This rating
source, however, is weighted by what is called credibility,
which is derived from the rating ratio. The delivery of the
SHI is achieved by hash-chain based authentication.
An important reference for reputation systems in ad hoc
networks is Cooperation Of Nodes—Fairness In Dynamic
Ad-hoc Networks (CONFIDANT) [16]. It is a reputation-
based secure routing framework in which nodes monitor
their neighborhood and detect diﬀerent kinds of misbehav-
ior by means of an enhanced PACK mechanism. The nodes
use the second-hand information from others as a resource of
rating, as well. The protocol is based on Bayesian estimation
that aims to classify other nodes as misbehaving or normal.
The observing node excludes misbehaving nodes from the
network as a response, by both avoiding them for routing
and denying them cooperation. The protocol assumes a DSR
operational routing protocol and lacks a provision on WSN
constraints and conditions as it is designed for general ad hoc
networks.
Another famous reputation mechanism in literature is
CORE protocol (Collaborative Reputation Mechanism to
Enforce Node Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks)
[5]. It is a complete reputation mechanism that diﬀerentiates
between subjective reputations or observations, indirect
reputation which includes only the positive reports by
others (SHI), and functional reputation, also referred as
task-specific behavior, which are weighted according to a
combined reputation value that is used to make decisions
about cooperation or gradual isolation of a node. The
system assumes a DSR routing in which nodes can be
requesters or providers. The rating is done by comparing
the expected result with the actually obtained result of
a request.
The authors of [7] proposed a robust reputation system
for P2P and mobile ad hoc networks. Their main contri-
bution is its proposal for a distributed reputation system
that can handle false disseminated information. Every node
maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about every
node that is of interest. The authors use a modified Bayesian
approach so that they will accept only an SHI set that is
compatible with the current reputation rating. Also, Trust
ratings are updated based on the compatibility of second-
hand reputation information with prior reputation ratings.
The work avoids exploitation of good behavior that can be
incorrectly built over time by introducing a concept of re-
evaluation and reputation fading.
The work in [17] is an integrated approach that provides
energy, eﬃciency, reliability, scalability, and support for QoS.
It applies TRAP; a trust-aware routing protocol that derives
its routes based on link quality and echo ratio (node packets
forwarded by j that belong to i to the total broadcasted
packets by i) and from both components a reputation system
is developed.
An algebraic approach is adopted in [18], where the trust
inference problem is modeled as a generalized shortest path
problem on a weighted directed graph. A weighted edge
from vertex to vertex corresponds to the opinion that entity,
also referred to as the issuer, has about entity. Each opinion
consists of two numbers: the trust value, and the confidence
value. To enhance the reliability of the system, multiple trust
paths are utilized to compute the trust distance from the
source to the destination. The essence of this approach is
the two operators used to combine opinions. One operator
combines opinions along a path, while the other operator
combines opinions across paths. Eventually, we end with
solving path problems in graphs, provided that they satisfy
certain mathematical properties, that is, form an algebraic
structure called a semiring.
Another recent work on developing a reputation system
is the one presented in [19]. It incorporates a measure of
uncertainty based on subjective logic into the reputation
system to reflect the confidence in such system.
The closest work in literature that tackles WSN specif-
ically is RFSN [20]. This work proposed a reputation-
based framework for sensor networks, where nodes maintain
reputation for other nodes and use it to evaluate their
trustworthiness. The authors tried to focus on an abstract
view that provides a scalable, diverse, and a generalized
approach hoping to tackle all types of misbehaviors. They
also designed a system within this framework and employed
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a Bayesian formulation, using a beta distribution model for
reputation representation.
The system starts the operation by monitoring. Monitor-
ing mechanism follows the classic watchdog methodology in
which a node is assumed to be in a promiscuous mode to
overhear neighbors’ packets. Monitoring behavioral events
can result in either cooperative event, α, in which a node
is behaving well or noncooperative behavior, β, in which a
node misbehaves. The count of each type is injected into
the beta distribution formula as the distribution parameters
to calculate the node reputation R. This formula calculates
node’s reputation based on FHI. The reputation is updated
based on the new monitoring events, SHI received and
according to the age of the current reputation value. Any
response action is based on selecting the most trusted node.
The trust value of a node that is used for decision making
is calculated as the statistical expectation of the reputation
value.
RFSN, however, lacks some important points.
(i) The monitoring mechanism uses a normal watchdog
mechanism that assumes a promiscuous mode oper-
ation for every node. This is not suitable for the WSN
conditions in terms of energy scarcity as discussed
earlier.
(ii) The work does not propose a response methodology,
for example, a routing algorithm. Instead, it leaves
it as an open issue. Therefore, the work lacks
performance figures that can show the eﬃciency and
security gain and benefits in routing operation that
can be obtained in adopting this solution.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we proposed a new rating approach for
reputation systems in WSN called CRATER. CRATER eval-
uates nodes reputation by a risk representation. This risk
value is computed based on first hand information (FHI),
second hand information (SHI), and idle behavior (NBP).
The mathematical modeling of CRATER assumes a set of
conditions that we define as cautious assumptions in which
a node is very cautious in dealing with other’s information.
Our proposed approach is robust against nonforwarding
attack and we hint in our discussion for its ability to mitigate
bad mouthing attack. Also, CRATER is a modular approach
that can easily be modified to tackle other attacking such as
colluding attacks.
CRATER has been evaluated using our novel evaluation
technique RESISTOR. Simulation results proved our expec-
tation on how CRATER should behave. CRATER parameters
variations were directly reflected in our proposed resistance
figure and trust-awareness knowledge evolution.
As a future work, we suggest the following important
research directions.
(i) Using RESISTOR for comparisons among diﬀerent
rating methods: to further prove the eﬃciency of
RESISTOR as an appropriate tool to measure dif-
ferent reputation systems, we can use other rating
techniques and trust evolution algorithms instead of
CRATER and then use RESISTOR to evaluate these
diﬀerent systems and compare the results with other
evaluation techniques. This can help in achieving
standardized mechanisms to evaluate reputation sys-
tems.
(ii) Modifying routing protocol to have oﬀensive and
dismissal response: in our reputation system, our
response part performs a defensive function in the
sense that it only avoids malicious nodes without
any further actions against them. However, we can
make use of the obtained risk values and the trust
relations to enhance system response to function
in oﬀensive manner (e.g., not forwarding malicious
nodes’ packets) or dismissal manner (e.g., total
isolation of malicious nodes). This will be done by
designing certain thresholds that determine how and
when such actions should be taken. These thresholds
will be set by the network operator by the aid of
RESISTOR.
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